Saturday, August 24, 2019

Text analyses Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 500 words

Text analyses - Essay Example The writer introduces the topic by giving the details on Sydney Central Station. This introduction gives information on its location, the people it serves and its purpose. The same paragraph also introduces the major discussion in the text. The writer then discusses the topic in the subsequent paragraphs before making a conclusion in the last paragraph to recap the content of the body. There is a positive attempt in sentence structure and development of paragraphs. The sentences contain a noun and verb such as in â€Å"As a public sector, Sydney central station is the largest railway station in Australia.† The paragraphs have an introductory sentence and the subsequent sentences support the idea before the concluding sentence recaps them as indicated in the fifth paragraph. Right from the introductory paragraph, the writer exhibits proper coordination through appropriate use of conjunctions such as although, indeed, generally and therefore. For example, â€Å"Although Sydney central station is...† and â€Å"Therefore, in order to give some useful advises†¦Ã¢â‚¬  used to introduce a contradictory sentence and to express an eventuality respectively. There is good use of noun phrases such as â€Å"poor facilities† and â€Å"long queues†. Both simple and complex sentences have been correctly used. Examples include â€Å"Therefore, all the series of problems are to be solved† and â€Å"Typically, the Sydney central railway station is responsible for satisfying all customers and improving the high level of service† respectively. The writer uses active voice to show authority in expressing own opinion. This is seen in â€Å"In my opinion, it is†¦Ã¢â‚¬  This is critically used in the conclusion paragraph to stam p authority in the essay. On the other hand, the writer portrays some weaknesses in the essay. There is inappropriate use of conjunctions such as above all in â€Å"above all, the most obvious symbol of the station’s problem†¦Ã¢â‚¬  The writer sought

Friday, August 23, 2019

Findings and Analysis Dissertation Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 3500 words

Findings and Analysis - Dissertation Example Fig. 4.1 Key Themes The findings and analysis shall also include basic information on employees of B&M and their views on how they think management of B&M can improve on recruitment and selection process in the future and how management can retain workers who come into the company. 4.2 PRESENTATION AND DESCRIPTION OF RESULTS/FINDINGS Background Information on the Company and Workers B&M is a non profit organisation that offers free advice on issues relating to housing, money, debt, and welfare benefits services to the members of community. The company is located in London. It has been operating for more than forty (40) years and has been supported by the government such as The Home Office, City Council, and Community Initiative; Local Housing Association and Charity donations. The company recruits both paid and unpaid workers from the community and it has been run by voluntary committee of Management. The size of the organisation is very small consisting of operation manager, money a dvisor, debt advisor, administrator and volunteers to deliver the service. The sample for the interview was made up of five out of six workers of the company who were all females. ... On the role of workers in the company, all two (2) student-workers are trainee case workers. One (1) fulltime worker is a case worker, one (1) is a senior case worker and the other one (1) is the operations manager of the company. All participants acknowledged that their roles were very important in the running of the company. Among the five workers interviewed, the two student-workers have worked in the company for three and four months respectively. All the three full time workers have worked in B&M for three years. It was however revealed that the operations manager has over twenty years of experience working in similar work set up. Recruitment and Selection Methods and Processes used by B&M Recruitment as the recruitment is the process of identifying and hiring best-qualified candidate (from within or outside of an organization) for a job vacancy, in a most timely and cost effective manner (www.businessdictionary.com). When a company recruits from among its existing workers, we s ay they are practicing internal recruitment. On the other hand, when the company involves people who are outside its staff base in the recruitment, it is said to be undertaking external method of recruitment. Because of the staff size of B&M, the organisation uses external recruitment and selection method exclusively to get applicants to apply for vacancies. The mode of advertisement for vacancies, according to participants was mainly through the use of local community newspaper and university career employability. Reasons given by fulltime workers on why the organisation uses of community newspaper was that the organisation did not have enough funds to run expensive and wide range advertisement. It was also

Thursday, August 22, 2019

The Death Penalty, the American Public Opinion, and the Factors Essay

The Death Penalty, the American Public Opinion, and the Factors Affecting the Americans Position on the Death penalty - Essay Example Historical crimes punishable by death in the U.S. were concealing birth, slave revolts, piracy, witchcraft, and guerrilla activity.1 In the late 1970s, lethal injection was developed as a more humane alternative than electric chair, which had been the principal execution method in the United States for more than 7 decades.2 Under discretionary statutes, juries control decisions on the death sentence of defendants which could result in arbitrary verdicts. This arbitrariness was ruled by the court as a violation of both the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment and the 14th Amendment’s assurance of equal protection under the law. The constitutionality of capital punishment was questioned and the states stopped executions. In 1972, the Supreme Court decided to suspend the death penalty in all executing states. Four years after the 1972 decision, the court ruled that death penalty sentencing laws should include a set of objective guidelines that wou ld help judges and juries in deciding whether a death sentence is deserved and just. The amendments led to the death penalty’s reinstatement in 1976. The court likewise affirmed that the death sentence was constitutional under the Eighth Amendment.3 The Poll Trends Today, the American public opinion on the death penalty has only fairly changed although with far less support than in the mid-1990s when public acceptance was at a remarkable climax. In a survey performed in November 9-14, 2011 by the Pew Research Center for the People & the Press and the Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, in two thousand adults, 62% are in favour of the death penalty for persons convicted of murder while 31% are opposed to it. In 1996, 78% favoured death penalty for murder offenders. Support for capital punishment then declined, dropped to 66% in 2001, 62% in 2005, and 58% in October 2011.4 In Gallup’s first survey about the death penalty in 1936, â€Å"Are you in favour of the death pe nalty for a person convicted of murder?† 59% recorded support and dropped to an unsurpassed decline of 42% in 1966, which was the first time there was more opposition than support over the 75-year course of the survey. Between 1970 and 1980, the support for capital punishment rose again and peaked in the mid-1990s.5 Factors That Might Change the Americans’ Position on the Death Penalty In some old analyses, it was recorded that not many death penalty supporters are influenced by information that death penalty is not a deterrent to crimes and that it is not cruel and unjust.6 On a recent study, 42% of respondents stated that a non-white defendant has higher probability of receiving the death sentence than a white defendant.7 In another study, 49% concurred that a black would more likely be sentenced to death than a white, and 67% agreed that a poor defendant was more likely to receive a death sentence than a non-poor.8 On a survey regarding deterrence issue, death penalt y supporters were asked if they would still support capital punishment even if new substantiation confirms that it does not decrease the rate of murders. 69% to 73% of respondents affirmed their support.9 Incapacitation: Prevents Murderers from Killing Again Life imprisonment without parole is an alternative that renders the death penalty unnecessary. From views, majority of the death penalty supporters consider incapacitation as a relatively insignificant concern. In the 1991 Gallup survey, merely 19% of supporters cited incapacitation ("Keeps them from killing again") as a basis for their support, while 50% cited retribution ("A life for a life").10 This result, nevertheless,

The Crumbling Taj Essay Example for Free

The Crumbling Taj Essay The reaction rate, however, should decrease as the experiment progresses because as the reaction time increases the number of hydrochloric acid molecules present will decrease as they have been reacted to form water calcium chloride and carbon dioxide. The additional water and calcium chloride present as the experiment progresses should decrease the rate of reaction because of decrease in concentration. This should make a graph of the reaction curved as the reaction rate slows down. Kinetic theory is based on the assumption that chemical reactions take place as a result of reacting particles colliding successfully. Successful collisions need a sufficient amount of energy. Particles that posses more kinetic energy than the activation energy are able to react more successfully. The reacting particles all have different kinetic energies due to collisions hanging their speeds. Maxwell and Boltzmann presented the distribution in kinetic energies for two temperatures (high and low) in graphs called distribution curves on which the areas under the curves past the points called energy barriers represent the number of kinetic energies. The bigger the area under the curve, the greater the number of particles with a certain energy that will promote a chemical reaction. Hotter particles have extra kinetic energy after surmounting the number of collisions in unit time. These collisions are more likely to be successful as there would be more than enough energy for them. Although I will not be looking at the factor of TEMPERATURE, I can extend my investigation and experiment the effects of temperature on the rate of reaction. HYPOTHESIS FOR EXPERIMENT 1 COUNTING BUBBLES Counting bubbles is an experiment which I personally think is not very fair. There may be many mistakes in counting the number of bubbles produced for five continuous minutes and so the experiment would not be accurate. Although this experiment isnt so accurate, I think that the results will still show a trend in the pattern of results. I predict that if the concentration of the HCl is doubled then the experiment will happen twice as fast. HYPOTHESIS FOR EXPERIMENT 2 COLLECTING GAS OVER WATER By putting more particles into the reaction, the chance of them colliding increases and so the rate increases. Concentration is a variable that is continuous and independent. I shall test this variable by observing the rate at which hydrogen gas collects over water against the concentration of hydrochloric acid used with CaCO3. I predict that by doubling the concentration of the acid, the rate of reaction will also double. The higher the concentration, the higher the rate of reaction. HYPOTHESIS FOR EXPERIMENT 3 COLLECTING GAS IN A SYRINGE This experiment is very similar to experiment 2 (collecting gas over water) but this experiment is the most accurate out of the three that I will be carrying out. I predict that I will have a very similar type of results and graphs as in experiment 2. I predict that the graph will have more better and accurate trend lines in the graphs showing a curved line of best fit. The higher you raise the concentration the more the particles will collide therefore corrosion of the marble will occur. Plan for the investigation. I will ensure that the goggles are worn throughout the experiments. Care will be taken not to spill any of the acid. Glass will be handled with care to prevent breakages and cuts. If any sort of accident occurs amends will be made with the help of trained technicians. Large volumes of acid will not be carried around to reduce the risk of a spillage. Containers will be kept well away from edges of the benches. Low molar concentration of hydrochloric acid will be used for safety. FAIR TEST To perform a fair test I will do as follows: In the experiment I will measure each substance accurately. I will carry out the experiment at the same room temperature of 20oc each time. I will wash the conical flask with distilled water after each experiment to make sure that there isnt any solution left over from the previous experiment. I will have to stay alert when counting bubbles and will have to concentrate hard. I will also repeat the test again and take the average of the two results to get an average set of results which will be more reliable. By following my fair testing the results will hopefully come out accurate. I will be alert and take the timings accurately for each of the experiments. METHOD FOR EXPERIMENT 1 COUNTING BUBBLES. This is how I will be carrying out my 1st experiment to find out the rate of reaction between marble and hydrochloric acid: When doing my experiments I will use the same procedure throughout. I will first get the necessary equipment that will be needed and will set it up as show below. I will then get 30ml of 0. 1M hydrochloric acid and will put it into the conical flask. To make sure the volumes of acid and water were right we will measure the volumes of each in a measuring cylinder to be accurate. To make sure the mass of marble chips are right we would measure them on the electronic balance to one decimal place. I will then get 2grams of marble chips (roughly the same size) and I will gently put the marble chips into the solution of hydrochloric acid and will spontaneously close the conical flask with the delivery tube that is attached to a bung at the end. As soon as I close the top of the flask, I will start the stopwatch and I will start counting the bubbles, which will be coming out from the test tube. I will record the number of bubbles produced each minute up to five minutes. The bubbles that will be produced will indicate how much CO2 is being given off by the reaction between CaCO3 and 2HCl. I will carry out this experiment again for Distilled water, 0. 5, 1. 0, 1. 5 and 2 molar to see how the concentration affect the rate of reaction. I will keep the amount of marble chips and hydrochloric acid the same for every test I carry out so it would be fair. At the end I will also carry out this experiment on distilled water so I can compare the two substances. In this experiment I will have to concentrate all the time as I will have to count the bubble for five minutes and will have to make sure that I dont miss out on counting a single bubble. After the experiment is over, I will carry out the experiment again to confirm my results and to make sure that I was counting the bubbles correctly. This picture shows how I am going to set-up my experiment and I am going to count the bubbles that come out of the test tube. METHOD FOR EXPERIMENT 2 COLLECTING MEASURING GAS This is how I will be carrying out my 2nd experiment to find out the rate of reaction between marble and hydrochloric acid: When doing my experiments I will use the same procedure throughout. I will first fill the tub with tap water about half way up and fill the measuring cylinder with water and then turn the measuring cylinder upside down into the tub of water so the cylinder would still be filled with water. By doing this, we will create a slight margin of error because some of the water will be displaced when doing this although it will be very little. Then we will clamp the measuring cylinder in place. We will change the size of the cylinders; however, this will not make the test unfair. We then will put the delivery tube under the cylinder so the air from the experiment could displace the water. To make sure the volumes of acid and water were right we will measure the volumes of each in a measuring cylinder to be accurate. I will then get 30ml of 0. 1M Hydrochloric acid and put it into the conical flask. To make sure the mass of marble chips are right we would measure them on the electronic balance to one decimal place. As soon as we put the Marble chips and the acid in the conical flask and close it with the bung which will be attached to a delivery tube; we will immediately start the stopwatch. We will see how long it takes (In seconds) for the measuring cylinder to fill up with 100cm3 of Carbon Dioxide gas. We will carry this experiment out on a range of different concentrations of Hydrochloric acid. I will be carrying out this experiment on 0. 5M, 1. 0M, 1. 5M and 2. 0M to see how the concentrations affect the rate of reaction. I will also use distilled water to compare it against the hydrochloric acid. After the experiment is over I shall carry out a retest to confirm my results and I will take the average out of the two results. Below it show exactly how the experiment was set up. METHOD FOR EXPERIMENT 3 SYRINGE TEST This is how I will be carrying out my 3rd experiment to find out the rate of reaction between marble and hydrochloric acid: When doing my experiments I will use the same procedure throughout. I will first get the necessary equipment that will be needed and will set it up as show below. In this experiment I will again experiment the time it will take for the syringe to fill up with 100cm3 of Carbon Dioxide gas. Although this experiment will be very similar to Experiment 2, this will be more accurate as the equipment used will be more appropriate. I would assume the results in this test to be very similar to Experiment 2 so I will change the amount of Marble chips and the volume of the Hydrochloric acid to experiment what different it makes. I will used 5 grams of marble chips and 50 cm3 of Hydrochloric acid in this test but will used the same range of concentrations which are, 0. 1M, 0. 5M, 1. 0M, 1. 5M, 2M and will also use distilled water. I will do the same, starting of with 0. 1M Hydrochloric acid and put it into the conical flask. As soon as we put the Marble chips and the acid in the conical flask and close it with the bung which will be attached to a delivery tube; we will immediately start the stopwatch. We will see how long it takes (In seconds) for the measuring cylinder to fill up with 100cm3 of Carbon Dioxide gas. After the experiment is over I shall carry out a retest to confirm my results and I will take the average out of the two results. Table of Results for the method of counting the bubbles. Mass of marble /g Concentration of HCl in 30cm3 / M Time In Mins Bubbles collected Expt. 1 Bubbles collected Expt. 2 Bubbles collected Average Initial temperature / oC 2g Distilled water 1 2 3 4 5u.

Wednesday, August 21, 2019

Corporate Governance Score and Firm Performance

Corporate Governance Score and Firm Performance Limited liability company structure is the most preferred structure for a large business. In this structure, a large number of investors provide the risk capital. They are called shareholders, the deemed owners of the company. They delegate the power to manage the company to board of directors. The board delegates the same to managers while retaining its role to monitor and control the executive management. Shareholders are viewed as the principal and the manager as their agents and this relationship is described as principal-agent relationship. The shareholders, of a widely held firm, practically do not have any control on the managers. They are only informed of the financial results on a periodical basis while the managers controls the firms assets. This structure provides an opportunity to the managers to expropriate shareholders wealth and misappropriate the funds by way of transfer of money as loans to his own companies, or sale of the company assets to themselves at a lesser pr ice or pay themselves more perks. The divergence of interest between the owners and the managers, due to the separation of ownership from control, results in the agency costs. It is not just separation of ownership and control that gives rise to the agency problem between shareholders and managers; but also the atomistic or diffused nature of corporate ownership, which is characterized by a large number of small shareholders. In such ownership structure, there is no incentive for any one owner to monitor corporate management, because the individual owner would bear the entire monitoring costs, yet all shareholders would enjoy the benefits. Thus, both the magnitude and nature of agency problems are directly related to ownership structures. The fundamental theoretical basis of corporate governance is agency costs. The core of corporate governance is designing and putting in place disclosures, monitoring, oversight and corrective systems that can align the objectives of the shareholders and managers as closely as possible and hence, minimize agency costs. It deals with conducting the affairs of a company such that there is fairness to all stakeholders and that its actions benefit the greatest number of stakeholders. There are two kinds of mechanisms to overcome the agency problem and hence, improve corporate governance viz., the internal control mechanisms and the external control mechanisms. Internal control mechanisms are internal to the functioning of a company and broadly consist of the board composition, the board size, the leadership structure and the managerial compensation. External control mechanisms are the mechanisms that are external to the functioning of the firm over which the firm has no control. An increasingly important external control mechanism affecting governance worldwide is the emergence of institutional investors as equity owners. Although the role that the institutional investors can play in the corporate governance system of a company is a controversial question and a subject of continuing debate. While some believe that the institutional investors must interfere in the corporate governance system of a company, others believe that these investors have other investment objectives to follow. The group of observers who believe that institutional investors need not play a role in the corporate governance system of a company, argue that the investment objectives and the compensation system in the institutional investing companies often discourage their active participation in the corporate governance system of the companies. Institutional investors are answerable to their investors the way the companies (in which they have invested) are answerable to their shareholders. And the shareholders do invest their funds with the institutional investors expecting higher returns. The primary responsibility of the instituti onal investors is therefore to invest the money of the investors in companies, which are expected to generate the maximum possible return rather than in companies with good corporate governance records. While the other group strongly believes that if the corporate governance system in the companies has to succeed then the institutional investors must play an active role in the entire process. By virtue of their large stockholdings, they have the opportunity, resources, and ability to monitor, discipline and influence managers, which can force them to focus more on corporate performance and less on self-serving behavior. Most of the reports on corporate governance have also emphasized the role that the institutional investors have to play in the entire system. Given the increasing presence of institutional investors in financial markets, it is not surprising that they have become more active in their role as shareholders. Activism by institutional investors has been both private and public, with the public activism being most visible in many countries. The role of institutional investors is visualized in two perspectives, the corporate governance and the firm performance. 7.2 Objectives of Study In light of the above discussion, the present study attempts to achieve the following objectives: To construct the corporate governance score To establish relationship between institutional holdings and corporate  governance score To establish relationship between institutional holdings and firm performance To establish relationship between corporate governance score and  firm performance In order to achieve the objectives stated above, the present study conceptualized the following null hypotheses for the validation of positive relationship between institutional holdings, corporate governance and firm performance 7.3 Hypotheses: H01: Institutional/its components Holdings and Corporate Governance score are  very closely related in a manner as to depict a positive relationship between  the two H02: Corporate Governance Score and Institutional/its components Holdings are  also very closely related in a manner as to depict positive relationship  between the two H03: Institutional/its components Holdings and various measures of firm  performance are very closely related in a manner as to depict  positive relationship between the two H04: Corporate Governance Score and various measures of firm performance  are very closely related in a manner as to depict positive relationship between  the two 7.4 The Sample Design and Data: To achieve the above objectives, a sample of 200 companies has been taken. The present study is based on the secondary data. It covers a period of five financial years from 1st April 2004 to 31st March 2008. Institutional holdings are further segregated into three constituents. The mutual funds being the first one. The second constituent includes various public and private sector banks, all the developmental financial institutions (like IFCI, ICICI, IDBI, SFC) and insurance companies like the LIC, GIC, and their subsidiaries. The last constituent comprise of foreign institutional investors. Data has been collected on the institutional holdings in total as well as on different constituents of institutional holdings from nseindia.com. The secondary data regarding annual reports to construct the corporate governance score have been collected from respective company websites and sebiedifar.com. . The firm performance measures have been divided into two categories, one being the accountin g measures while others are based on market returns. The accounting return measures include (%) return on networth, (%) return on capital employed, Profit After Tax, (%) Return on Assets, Net Profit Margin and Earning Per Share. Whereas, market return based measures include Tobins Q, (%) Risk Adjusted Excess Return and (%) Dividend Yield. Data for the study period on financial performance measures have been collected from Prowess Database. 7.5 Statistical Tools: Simple linear regression analysis has been used as a statistical tool to investigate the relationship between different variables. An attempt has been made to ascertain the causal effect of one variable upon another. Data has been assembled on the variables of interest and employed regression to estimate the quantitative effect of the causal variables upon the variable that they influence. The study also typically assesses the statistical significance at 5 percent level of the estimated relationships, that is, the degree of confidence that the true relationship is close to the estimated relationship. Section A 7.6 Construction of Corporate Governance Score Review of Literature Some researchers have used board characteristics as an effective measure of corporate governance as Hermalin and Weisbach (1998, 2003) have used board independence, Bhagat, Carey and Elson (1999) have used stock ownership of board members and Brickley, Coles and Jarrell (1997) have used the occupation of Chairman and CEO positions by the same or two different individuals. Whereas, Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) have constructed a governance measure comprising of an equally weighted index of 24 corporate governance provisions compiled by the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC), such as, poison pills, golden parachutes, classified boards, cumulative voting, and supermajority rules to approve mergers. Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell (BCF, 2004) created an entrenchment index comprising of six provisions – four provisions that limit Shareholder rights and two that make potential hostile takeovers more difficult. While the above noted studies use IRRC data, Brown and Caylor (2004) used Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) data to create their governance index. This index considered 51corporate governance features encompassing eight corporate governance categories: audit, board of directors, charter/bylaws, director education, executive and director compensation, ownership, progressive practices, and state of incorporation. In the present study, Corporate Governance Score has been developed on the basis of key characteristics of Standard and Poors Transparency and Disclosure Benchmark. Standard and Poors provides a range of corporate governance analyses and services, the crux of which is the Corporate Governance Score. Corporate Governance Scores are based on an assessment of the qualitative aspects of corporate governance practices of a company. Information has been collected on the attributes from the latest available annual reports of sample companies. The methodology, with 98 questions in three categories and 12 sub-categories, is designed to balance the conflicting requirements of the range of issues analyzed and the tractability of the analysis. Transparency and Disclosure is evaluated by searching company annual reports for the 98  possible attributes broadly divided into the following three broad categories: Ownership structure and investor rights (28 attributes) Financial transparency and information disclosure (35 attributes) Board and management structure and process (35 attributes) Resume Various researchers have considered alternate measures of corporate governance. Some of them have used single measure, while others have used the multiple measures in the form of indices. In the present study, Corporate Governance Score has been developed on the basis of key characteristics of Standard and Poors Transparency and Disclosure Benchmark because two broad instruments that reduce agency costs and hence improve corporate governance are financial and non-financial disclosures and independent oversight of management. Improving the quality of financial and non-financial disclosures not only ensures corporate transparency among a wide group of investors, analysts and the informed intelligentsia, but also persuades companies to minimize value-destroying deviant behavior. This is precisely why law insists that companies prepare their audited annual accounts, and that these be provided to all shareholders is deposited with the Registrar of Companies. This is also why a good deal o f effort in global corporate governance reform has been directed to improve the quality and frequency of disclosures. Section B Relationship between Institutional Holdings and Corporate Governance: Review of Literature Coombes and Watson (2000) on the basis of a survey of more than 200 institutional investors with investments across the world showed that governance is a significant factor in their investment decision. McCahery, Sautner and Starks (2009) have relied on the survey data to investigate governance preference of 118 institutional investors in U.S. and Netherlands. The study found that the majority of institutions that responded to the survey take into account firm governance in portfolio weighting decisions and are willing to engage in activities that can improve the governance of their portfolio firms. Chung, Firth, and Kim (2002) hypothesized that there will be less opportunistic earnings management in firms with more institutional investor ownership because the institutions will either put pressure on the firms to adopt better accounting policies. Hartzell and Starks (2003) provided empirical evidence suggesting institutional investors serve a monitoring role with regard to executive compensation contracts. One implication of these results, consistent with the theoretical literature regarding the role of the large shareholder, is that institutions have greater influence when they have larger proportional stakes in firms. . Denis and Denis (1994) found no evidence to suggest that there is any relationship between institutional holdings and corporate governance. They stated that if companies that create shareholders wealth are the ones with poor corporate governance practices, and then one really cannot blame the institutional investors for having invested in such companies. For, after all, a fund manager will be evaluated on the basis of stock returns he creates for the unit holders and not on the basis of the corporate governance records of the company he invests the money in. If however, one finds that companies with poor corporate governance practices are the ones, which have consistently destroyed shareholders wealth, then the contention that the institutional investors need not look at corporate governance records cannot be justified. David and Kochhar (1996) provided empirical evidence regarding impact of institutional investors on firm behaviour and performance is mixed and that no definite concl usions can be drawn. They argued that various institutional obstacles, such as barriers stemming from business relationships, the regulatory environment and information processing limitations, might prevent institutional investors from effectively exercising their corporate governance function. Almazan, Hartzell and Starks (2003) provided evidence both theoretical and empirical that the monitoring influence of institutional investors on executive compensation can depend on the current or prospective business relation between the institution and the corporation. They concluded that the monitoring influence of institutions is associated more with potentially active institutions (investment companies and pension fund managers who would be less sensitive to pressure from corporate management due to lack of potential business relations) than with potentially passive institutions (banks and insurance companies who would be more pressure-sensitive). Davis and Kim (2006) found that mutual funds with conflicts of interest (based on management of pension assets) more often vote with management in general. On the other hand, mutual funds have more incentive and power to oppose management in firms in which they have a larger stake. Marsh (1997) has argued that short-term performance measurement does work against the active monitoring by institutional investors. The performance of fund managers is evaluated over a shorter time period. Hence, they act under tremendous pressure to beat some index. So, when they find a case of bad governance, they find it economical to sell the stock rather than interfere in the functioning of the company and incur monitoring costs. Ashraf and Jayaman (2007) examined mutual funds trading behavior after the release of voting records. The study found that funds that support shareholder proposals reduce holdings after the release of voting records. Since the time of releasing voting records could be very far from the shareholder meeting date, mutual funds trading behavior after the release of voting records may be unrelated to the votes cast in the meeting. Aggarwal, Klapper and Wysocki (2003) found that U.S. mutual funds tend to invest greater amounts in countries with stronger share holder rights and legal frameworks (controlling for the countrys economic development). In addition, within the countries, the mutual funds also discriminate on the basis of governance in that they allocate more of their assets to firms with better corporate governance structures. Payne, Millar, and Glezen (1996) focussed on banks as one type of institutional investor that would be expected to have business relations with the firms in which they invest. They examined interlocking directorships and income-related relationships, and noticed that when such relations exist; banks tend to vote in favor of management anti-takeover amendment proposals. When such relations dont exist, banks tend to vote against the management proposals. Brickley, Lease and Smith (1988) found evidence supporting the hypothesis that firms with greater holdings by pressure-sensitive shareholders (banks and insurance companies) have more proxy votes cast in favor of managements recommendations. Moreover, firms with greater holdings by pressure-insensitive shareholders (pension funds and mutual funds) have more proxy votes against managements recommendations. The authors differentiated between the different types of institutional investors, noting the difference between pressure-sensitive and pressure-insensitive institutional shareholders and arguing that pressure-sensitive institutions are more likely to go along with management decisions. Dahlquist et al. (2003) analyzed foreign ownership and firm characteristics for the Swedish market. The study found that foreigners have greater presence in large firms, firms paying low dividends and in firms with large cash holdings. Haw, Hu, Hwang and Wu (2004) found that firm level factors cause information asymmetry problems to FII. It found evidence that US investment is lower in firms where managers do not have effective control. Foreign investment in firms that appear to engage in more earnings management is lower in countries with poor information framework. Choe, Kho, Stulz (2005) found that US investors do indeed hold fewer shares in firms with ownership structures that are more conducive to expropriation by controlling insiders. In companies where insiders are dominating information access and availability to the shareholders will be limited. With less information, foreign investors face an adverse selection problem. So they under invest in such stocks. Leuz, Lins, and Wa rnock (2008) found that foreign institutional investors prefer to invest in firms with better governance practices. In the present study, the analysis has been conducted in three perspectives: Dynamics of institutional holdings and its composition (2) Relationship between Institutional Holdings (explanatory variable) and the Corporate Governance Score (dependent variable) (3) Relationship between the Corporate Governance Score (explanatory variable) and Institutional Holdings (dependent variable) The major findings of the present study on the above aspects are summarized as under: The results outputs of the first segment depict that the institutional investors have increased their proportional holdings in the companies over the years. The number of sampled companies with higher institutional holdings has increased where as the number of companies with lower proportions of institutional holdings has decreased over the study period. Hence, institutional holdings have shown an increasing trend of investment in the sampled companies over the study period. As far as the dynamics of components of institutional investors is concerned, no specific trend is observed in investments of mutual funds. On the other hand Banks, Financial Institutions and Insurance Companies have shown declining trends of investments over the same period. Where as, foreign institutional investors have shown the increasing trends of investments in line with institutional holdings. The results outputs pertaining to the analysis of relationship between institutional holdings and corporate governance state that the larger proportions of institutional holdings have higher corporate governance scores in sampled companies and the smaller proportions of institutional holdings have lower governance scores in the sampled companies over the study period. Thus, very strong and positive relationship is established between institutional holdings and corporate governance. Hence, H01 is accepted. The results outputs of the section analyzing the relationship between corporate governance score and institutional holdings describe that the companies with higher governance scores have larger proportions of investments from institutional investors than the companies with lower governance scores. Therefore, very strong and positive relationship also exists between corporate governance score and institutional holdings. Hence, H02 is accepted. The inference can be drawn that institut ional holdings pre-empts good corporate governance still at other times, good corporate governance endues institutional investment in the firm. The results outputs pertaining to the analysis of relationship between mutual funds and corporate governance reveal out that smaller proportions of mutual funds holdings have higher governance score in the sampled companies and larger proportions of mutual funds holdings have lower governance scores in the sampled companies over the study period. Therefore, weak relationship exists between mutual funds holdings and corporate governance score. Hence, H01 is rejected. Alternatively, the results outputs pertaining to the analysis of relationship between corporate governance and components of institutional holdings reveal out that the companies with lower governance scores have larger proportions of mutual funds holdings to the companies with higher governance scores over the study period. Hence, weak relationship also exists between corporate governance score and mutual funds holdings. Hence, H02 is rejected. It can be inferred from the above outcomes that mutual funds companies do not observe good governance practices in companies and simultaneously, good governed companies also do not attract higher mutual funds investments. The results outputs as to the relationship between Banks, FIs and ICs and corporate governance depict that larger proportions of Banks, Financial Institutions and Insurance Companies holdings have higher governance score and smaller proportions of holdings have lower governance score in the sampled companies over the study period. Therefore, very strong and positive relationship is established between Banks, Financial Institutions and Insurance Companies holdings and corporate governance score. Hence, H01 is accepted. Similarly, the sampled companies with higher governance scores have larger proportions of Banks, FIs and ICs holdings to the companies with lower governance scores. Thus, very strong and positive relationship also exists between corporate governance score and Banks, FIs and ICs holdings. Hence, H02 is also accepted. The inference can be drawn on the basis of above results that Banks, FIs and ICs consider governance practices in companies while taking investment decision and alternatively, good governed companies also attract these investments. The results outputs pertaining to the relationship between FII holdings and corporate governance reveal out that the companies in which FIIs have larger proportions of holdings have higher governance score to the companies in which FIIs have smaller proportions of holdings. Therefore, very strong and positive relationship is observed between FII holdings and corporate governance score. Hence, H01 is accepted. Likewise, the sampled companies with higher governance scores have also larger proportions of Foreign Institutional Investors holdings. Thus, very strong and positive relationship also exists between corporate governance score and FII holdings. Hence, H02 is accepted. It can be inferred on the basis of above result that foreign institutional investors prefer to invest in firms with better governance practices and their investment do improve the governance practices in the companies. Resume The theoretical and empirical literature provides mixed evidence as to the relationship between institutional holdings and corporate governance. Some of the studies put forth the evidence that corporate governance is the significant factor for institutional investment decision and their significant investment improve the governance practices in companies, while the other studies state otherwise. Where as the research findings of the present study further validate, support and enrich the literature on positive association between institutional holdings and corporate governance. Likewise, the studies provide inconclusive evidence as to the relationship between mutual funds holdings and corporate governance. But the findings of present study state that neither the mutual funds care about the governance practices of companies or their presence improve them. Similarly, the empirical literature provides indeterminate evidence on the relationship between Banks, FIs and ICs and corporate governance. But the findings of present study observe very strong and positive relationship between the two. The empirical studies observe consistent results as to foreign institutional investors invest in better-governed companies but lacks evidence that their significant presence result in better governance. The findings of present study indicate that FIIs do not care for the corporate governance only, rather their higher stake ensure better governance too. Section C 7.8 Relationship between Institutional Holdings and Firm Performance: Review of Literature Pound (1988) explored the influence of institutional ownerships on firm performance and proposed three hypotheses on the relation between institutional shareholders and firm performance: efficient-monitoring hypothesis, conflict-of-interest hypothesis, and strategic-alignment hypothesis. The efficient-monitoring hypothesis says that institutional investors have greater expertise and can monitor management at lower cost than the small atomistic shareholders. Consequently, this argument predicts a positive relationship between institutional shareholding and firm performance. Holderness and Sheehan (1988) found that for a sample of 114 US firms controlled by a majority shareholder with more than 50% of shares, both Tobins Q and accounting profits are significantly lower for firms with individual majority owners than for firms with corporate majority owners. McConnell and Servaes (1990) found a strong positive relationship between the value of the firm and the fraction of shares held by institutional investors. They found that performance increases significantly with institutional ownership. Majumdar and Nagarajan (1994) found that levels of institutional investment are positively related to the current performance levels of firms. However, a less-stronger, though positive, effect is established between changes in performance levels and changes in institutional ownership. The results are based on a study investigating U.S. institutional investors investment strategy. Han and Suk (1998) found (for a sample of US firms) that stock returns are positively related to ownership by institutional investors, thus implying that these corporate owners are actively involved in the monitoring of incumbent management. Douma, Rejie and Kabir (2006) investigated the impact of foreign institutional investment on the performance of emerging market firms and found that there is positive effect of foreign ownership on firm performance. They also found impact of foreign investment on the business group affiliation of firms. Investor protection is poor in case of firms with controlling shareh olders who have ability to expropriate assets. The block shareholders affect the value of the firm and influence the private benefits they receive from the firm. Companies with such shareholders find it expensive to raise external funds. Studies examining the relationship between institutional holdings and firm performance in different countries (mainly OECD countries) have produced mixed results. Chaganti and Damanpour (1991) and Lowenstein (1991) find little evidence that institutional ownership is correlated with firm performance. Seifert, Gonenc and Wright (2005) study does not find a consistent relationship across countries. They conclude that their inconsistent results may reflect the fact that the influence of institutional investors on firm performance is location specific. The above studies generally consider institutional investors as a monolithic group. However, Shleifer and Vishnys (1986) as well as Pounds (1988) theorizations and later empirical examinations by McConnell and Servaes (1990) suggest that shareholders are differentiable and pursue different agendas. Jensen and Merkling (1976) also show that equity ownerships by different groups have different effects on the firm performance. Agrawal and Kno eber (1996), Karpoff et al. (1996), Duggal and Miller (1999) and Faccio and Lasfer (2000) find no such significant relation between institutional holdings and firm performance. In the present study, the analysis has been conducted in two perspectives: Institutional Holdings and Firm performance (b) Constituents of institutional holdings and Firm performance The major findings of the present study on the above aspects are summarized as under: The results outputs of the first segment indicate that there is no conclusive evidence as to larger proportions of institutional holdings in sampled companies have higher average return on networth or average net profit margin and smaller proportions of institutional holdings in sampled companies have lower average return on networth or average net profit margin over the study period. To the contrary, strong and positive relationship is observed between institutional holdings and return on capital employed as well as institutional holdings and earning per share. As the average return on capital employed and average earning per share are higher in the sampled companies with higher proportions of institutional holdings and lower in the sampled companies with lower proportions of institutional holdings over the study period. Therefore, it is stated that institutional holdings and two accounting returns (return on capital employed and earning per share) are significantly correlated where as institutional holdings and other two accounting returns (return on networth and net profit margin) are not related. Hence, there is no clear evidence that institutional holdings and accounting returns are related. Likewise, strong and positive relationship is observed between institutional holdings and Tobins q. But on the other hand, weak relationship is observed between institutional holdings and risk adjusted excess return. Therefore, institutional holdings and one market-based return are significantly correlated while the institutional holdings and another market-based return are not. Thus, the findings depict contradictory results as to the relationship between institutional holdings and market Corporate Governance Score and Firm Performance Corporate Governance Score and Firm Performance Limited liability company structure is the most preferred structure for a large business. In this structure, a large number of investors provide the risk capital. They are called shareholders, the deemed owners of the company. They delegate the power to manage the company to board of directors. The board delegates the same to managers while retaining its role to monitor and control the executive management. Shareholders are viewed as the principal and the manager as their agents and this relationship is described as principal-agent relationship. The shareholders, of a widely held firm, practically do not have any control on the managers. They are only informed of the financial results on a periodical basis while the managers controls the firms assets. This structure provides an opportunity to the managers to expropriate shareholders wealth and misappropriate the funds by way of transfer of money as loans to his own companies, or sale of the company assets to themselves at a lesser pr ice or pay themselves more perks. The divergence of interest between the owners and the managers, due to the separation of ownership from control, results in the agency costs. It is not just separation of ownership and control that gives rise to the agency problem between shareholders and managers; but also the atomistic or diffused nature of corporate ownership, which is characterized by a large number of small shareholders. In such ownership structure, there is no incentive for any one owner to monitor corporate management, because the individual owner would bear the entire monitoring costs, yet all shareholders would enjoy the benefits. Thus, both the magnitude and nature of agency problems are directly related to ownership structures. The fundamental theoretical basis of corporate governance is agency costs. The core of corporate governance is designing and putting in place disclosures, monitoring, oversight and corrective systems that can align the objectives of the shareholders and managers as closely as possible and hence, minimize agency costs. It deals with conducting the affairs of a company such that there is fairness to all stakeholders and that its actions benefit the greatest number of stakeholders. There are two kinds of mechanisms to overcome the agency problem and hence, improve corporate governance viz., the internal control mechanisms and the external control mechanisms. Internal control mechanisms are internal to the functioning of a company and broadly consist of the board composition, the board size, the leadership structure and the managerial compensation. External control mechanisms are the mechanisms that are external to the functioning of the firm over which the firm has no control. An increasingly important external control mechanism affecting governance worldwide is the emergence of institutional investors as equity owners. Although the role that the institutional investors can play in the corporate governance system of a company is a controversial question and a subject of continuing debate. While some believe that the institutional investors must interfere in the corporate governance system of a company, others believe that these investors have other investment objectives to follow. The group of observers who believe that institutional investors need not play a role in the corporate governance system of a company, argue that the investment objectives and the compensation system in the institutional investing companies often discourage their active participation in the corporate governance system of the companies. Institutional investors are answerable to their investors the way the companies (in which they have invested) are answerable to their shareholders. And the shareholders do invest their funds with the institutional investors expecting higher returns. The primary responsibility of the instituti onal investors is therefore to invest the money of the investors in companies, which are expected to generate the maximum possible return rather than in companies with good corporate governance records. While the other group strongly believes that if the corporate governance system in the companies has to succeed then the institutional investors must play an active role in the entire process. By virtue of their large stockholdings, they have the opportunity, resources, and ability to monitor, discipline and influence managers, which can force them to focus more on corporate performance and less on self-serving behavior. Most of the reports on corporate governance have also emphasized the role that the institutional investors have to play in the entire system. Given the increasing presence of institutional investors in financial markets, it is not surprising that they have become more active in their role as shareholders. Activism by institutional investors has been both private and public, with the public activism being most visible in many countries. The role of institutional investors is visualized in two perspectives, the corporate governance and the firm performance. 7.2 Objectives of Study In light of the above discussion, the present study attempts to achieve the following objectives: To construct the corporate governance score To establish relationship between institutional holdings and corporate  governance score To establish relationship between institutional holdings and firm performance To establish relationship between corporate governance score and  firm performance In order to achieve the objectives stated above, the present study conceptualized the following null hypotheses for the validation of positive relationship between institutional holdings, corporate governance and firm performance 7.3 Hypotheses: H01: Institutional/its components Holdings and Corporate Governance score are  very closely related in a manner as to depict a positive relationship between  the two H02: Corporate Governance Score and Institutional/its components Holdings are  also very closely related in a manner as to depict positive relationship  between the two H03: Institutional/its components Holdings and various measures of firm  performance are very closely related in a manner as to depict  positive relationship between the two H04: Corporate Governance Score and various measures of firm performance  are very closely related in a manner as to depict positive relationship between  the two 7.4 The Sample Design and Data: To achieve the above objectives, a sample of 200 companies has been taken. The present study is based on the secondary data. It covers a period of five financial years from 1st April 2004 to 31st March 2008. Institutional holdings are further segregated into three constituents. The mutual funds being the first one. The second constituent includes various public and private sector banks, all the developmental financial institutions (like IFCI, ICICI, IDBI, SFC) and insurance companies like the LIC, GIC, and their subsidiaries. The last constituent comprise of foreign institutional investors. Data has been collected on the institutional holdings in total as well as on different constituents of institutional holdings from nseindia.com. The secondary data regarding annual reports to construct the corporate governance score have been collected from respective company websites and sebiedifar.com. . The firm performance measures have been divided into two categories, one being the accountin g measures while others are based on market returns. The accounting return measures include (%) return on networth, (%) return on capital employed, Profit After Tax, (%) Return on Assets, Net Profit Margin and Earning Per Share. Whereas, market return based measures include Tobins Q, (%) Risk Adjusted Excess Return and (%) Dividend Yield. Data for the study period on financial performance measures have been collected from Prowess Database. 7.5 Statistical Tools: Simple linear regression analysis has been used as a statistical tool to investigate the relationship between different variables. An attempt has been made to ascertain the causal effect of one variable upon another. Data has been assembled on the variables of interest and employed regression to estimate the quantitative effect of the causal variables upon the variable that they influence. The study also typically assesses the statistical significance at 5 percent level of the estimated relationships, that is, the degree of confidence that the true relationship is close to the estimated relationship. Section A 7.6 Construction of Corporate Governance Score Review of Literature Some researchers have used board characteristics as an effective measure of corporate governance as Hermalin and Weisbach (1998, 2003) have used board independence, Bhagat, Carey and Elson (1999) have used stock ownership of board members and Brickley, Coles and Jarrell (1997) have used the occupation of Chairman and CEO positions by the same or two different individuals. Whereas, Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) have constructed a governance measure comprising of an equally weighted index of 24 corporate governance provisions compiled by the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC), such as, poison pills, golden parachutes, classified boards, cumulative voting, and supermajority rules to approve mergers. Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell (BCF, 2004) created an entrenchment index comprising of six provisions – four provisions that limit Shareholder rights and two that make potential hostile takeovers more difficult. While the above noted studies use IRRC data, Brown and Caylor (2004) used Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) data to create their governance index. This index considered 51corporate governance features encompassing eight corporate governance categories: audit, board of directors, charter/bylaws, director education, executive and director compensation, ownership, progressive practices, and state of incorporation. In the present study, Corporate Governance Score has been developed on the basis of key characteristics of Standard and Poors Transparency and Disclosure Benchmark. Standard and Poors provides a range of corporate governance analyses and services, the crux of which is the Corporate Governance Score. Corporate Governance Scores are based on an assessment of the qualitative aspects of corporate governance practices of a company. Information has been collected on the attributes from the latest available annual reports of sample companies. The methodology, with 98 questions in three categories and 12 sub-categories, is designed to balance the conflicting requirements of the range of issues analyzed and the tractability of the analysis. Transparency and Disclosure is evaluated by searching company annual reports for the 98  possible attributes broadly divided into the following three broad categories: Ownership structure and investor rights (28 attributes) Financial transparency and information disclosure (35 attributes) Board and management structure and process (35 attributes) Resume Various researchers have considered alternate measures of corporate governance. Some of them have used single measure, while others have used the multiple measures in the form of indices. In the present study, Corporate Governance Score has been developed on the basis of key characteristics of Standard and Poors Transparency and Disclosure Benchmark because two broad instruments that reduce agency costs and hence improve corporate governance are financial and non-financial disclosures and independent oversight of management. Improving the quality of financial and non-financial disclosures not only ensures corporate transparency among a wide group of investors, analysts and the informed intelligentsia, but also persuades companies to minimize value-destroying deviant behavior. This is precisely why law insists that companies prepare their audited annual accounts, and that these be provided to all shareholders is deposited with the Registrar of Companies. This is also why a good deal o f effort in global corporate governance reform has been directed to improve the quality and frequency of disclosures. Section B Relationship between Institutional Holdings and Corporate Governance: Review of Literature Coombes and Watson (2000) on the basis of a survey of more than 200 institutional investors with investments across the world showed that governance is a significant factor in their investment decision. McCahery, Sautner and Starks (2009) have relied on the survey data to investigate governance preference of 118 institutional investors in U.S. and Netherlands. The study found that the majority of institutions that responded to the survey take into account firm governance in portfolio weighting decisions and are willing to engage in activities that can improve the governance of their portfolio firms. Chung, Firth, and Kim (2002) hypothesized that there will be less opportunistic earnings management in firms with more institutional investor ownership because the institutions will either put pressure on the firms to adopt better accounting policies. Hartzell and Starks (2003) provided empirical evidence suggesting institutional investors serve a monitoring role with regard to executive compensation contracts. One implication of these results, consistent with the theoretical literature regarding the role of the large shareholder, is that institutions have greater influence when they have larger proportional stakes in firms. . Denis and Denis (1994) found no evidence to suggest that there is any relationship between institutional holdings and corporate governance. They stated that if companies that create shareholders wealth are the ones with poor corporate governance practices, and then one really cannot blame the institutional investors for having invested in such companies. For, after all, a fund manager will be evaluated on the basis of stock returns he creates for the unit holders and not on the basis of the corporate governance records of the company he invests the money in. If however, one finds that companies with poor corporate governance practices are the ones, which have consistently destroyed shareholders wealth, then the contention that the institutional investors need not look at corporate governance records cannot be justified. David and Kochhar (1996) provided empirical evidence regarding impact of institutional investors on firm behaviour and performance is mixed and that no definite concl usions can be drawn. They argued that various institutional obstacles, such as barriers stemming from business relationships, the regulatory environment and information processing limitations, might prevent institutional investors from effectively exercising their corporate governance function. Almazan, Hartzell and Starks (2003) provided evidence both theoretical and empirical that the monitoring influence of institutional investors on executive compensation can depend on the current or prospective business relation between the institution and the corporation. They concluded that the monitoring influence of institutions is associated more with potentially active institutions (investment companies and pension fund managers who would be less sensitive to pressure from corporate management due to lack of potential business relations) than with potentially passive institutions (banks and insurance companies who would be more pressure-sensitive). Davis and Kim (2006) found that mutual funds with conflicts of interest (based on management of pension assets) more often vote with management in general. On the other hand, mutual funds have more incentive and power to oppose management in firms in which they have a larger stake. Marsh (1997) has argued that short-term performance measurement does work against the active monitoring by institutional investors. The performance of fund managers is evaluated over a shorter time period. Hence, they act under tremendous pressure to beat some index. So, when they find a case of bad governance, they find it economical to sell the stock rather than interfere in the functioning of the company and incur monitoring costs. Ashraf and Jayaman (2007) examined mutual funds trading behavior after the release of voting records. The study found that funds that support shareholder proposals reduce holdings after the release of voting records. Since the time of releasing voting records could be very far from the shareholder meeting date, mutual funds trading behavior after the release of voting records may be unrelated to the votes cast in the meeting. Aggarwal, Klapper and Wysocki (2003) found that U.S. mutual funds tend to invest greater amounts in countries with stronger share holder rights and legal frameworks (controlling for the countrys economic development). In addition, within the countries, the mutual funds also discriminate on the basis of governance in that they allocate more of their assets to firms with better corporate governance structures. Payne, Millar, and Glezen (1996) focussed on banks as one type of institutional investor that would be expected to have business relations with the firms in which they invest. They examined interlocking directorships and income-related relationships, and noticed that when such relations exist; banks tend to vote in favor of management anti-takeover amendment proposals. When such relations dont exist, banks tend to vote against the management proposals. Brickley, Lease and Smith (1988) found evidence supporting the hypothesis that firms with greater holdings by pressure-sensitive shareholders (banks and insurance companies) have more proxy votes cast in favor of managements recommendations. Moreover, firms with greater holdings by pressure-insensitive shareholders (pension funds and mutual funds) have more proxy votes against managements recommendations. The authors differentiated between the different types of institutional investors, noting the difference between pressure-sensitive and pressure-insensitive institutional shareholders and arguing that pressure-sensitive institutions are more likely to go along with management decisions. Dahlquist et al. (2003) analyzed foreign ownership and firm characteristics for the Swedish market. The study found that foreigners have greater presence in large firms, firms paying low dividends and in firms with large cash holdings. Haw, Hu, Hwang and Wu (2004) found that firm level factors cause information asymmetry problems to FII. It found evidence that US investment is lower in firms where managers do not have effective control. Foreign investment in firms that appear to engage in more earnings management is lower in countries with poor information framework. Choe, Kho, Stulz (2005) found that US investors do indeed hold fewer shares in firms with ownership structures that are more conducive to expropriation by controlling insiders. In companies where insiders are dominating information access and availability to the shareholders will be limited. With less information, foreign investors face an adverse selection problem. So they under invest in such stocks. Leuz, Lins, and Wa rnock (2008) found that foreign institutional investors prefer to invest in firms with better governance practices. In the present study, the analysis has been conducted in three perspectives: Dynamics of institutional holdings and its composition (2) Relationship between Institutional Holdings (explanatory variable) and the Corporate Governance Score (dependent variable) (3) Relationship between the Corporate Governance Score (explanatory variable) and Institutional Holdings (dependent variable) The major findings of the present study on the above aspects are summarized as under: The results outputs of the first segment depict that the institutional investors have increased their proportional holdings in the companies over the years. The number of sampled companies with higher institutional holdings has increased where as the number of companies with lower proportions of institutional holdings has decreased over the study period. Hence, institutional holdings have shown an increasing trend of investment in the sampled companies over the study period. As far as the dynamics of components of institutional investors is concerned, no specific trend is observed in investments of mutual funds. On the other hand Banks, Financial Institutions and Insurance Companies have shown declining trends of investments over the same period. Where as, foreign institutional investors have shown the increasing trends of investments in line with institutional holdings. The results outputs pertaining to the analysis of relationship between institutional holdings and corporate governance state that the larger proportions of institutional holdings have higher corporate governance scores in sampled companies and the smaller proportions of institutional holdings have lower governance scores in the sampled companies over the study period. Thus, very strong and positive relationship is established between institutional holdings and corporate governance. Hence, H01 is accepted. The results outputs of the section analyzing the relationship between corporate governance score and institutional holdings describe that the companies with higher governance scores have larger proportions of investments from institutional investors than the companies with lower governance scores. Therefore, very strong and positive relationship also exists between corporate governance score and institutional holdings. Hence, H02 is accepted. The inference can be drawn that institut ional holdings pre-empts good corporate governance still at other times, good corporate governance endues institutional investment in the firm. The results outputs pertaining to the analysis of relationship between mutual funds and corporate governance reveal out that smaller proportions of mutual funds holdings have higher governance score in the sampled companies and larger proportions of mutual funds holdings have lower governance scores in the sampled companies over the study period. Therefore, weak relationship exists between mutual funds holdings and corporate governance score. Hence, H01 is rejected. Alternatively, the results outputs pertaining to the analysis of relationship between corporate governance and components of institutional holdings reveal out that the companies with lower governance scores have larger proportions of mutual funds holdings to the companies with higher governance scores over the study period. Hence, weak relationship also exists between corporate governance score and mutual funds holdings. Hence, H02 is rejected. It can be inferred from the above outcomes that mutual funds companies do not observe good governance practices in companies and simultaneously, good governed companies also do not attract higher mutual funds investments. The results outputs as to the relationship between Banks, FIs and ICs and corporate governance depict that larger proportions of Banks, Financial Institutions and Insurance Companies holdings have higher governance score and smaller proportions of holdings have lower governance score in the sampled companies over the study period. Therefore, very strong and positive relationship is established between Banks, Financial Institutions and Insurance Companies holdings and corporate governance score. Hence, H01 is accepted. Similarly, the sampled companies with higher governance scores have larger proportions of Banks, FIs and ICs holdings to the companies with lower governance scores. Thus, very strong and positive relationship also exists between corporate governance score and Banks, FIs and ICs holdings. Hence, H02 is also accepted. The inference can be drawn on the basis of above results that Banks, FIs and ICs consider governance practices in companies while taking investment decision and alternatively, good governed companies also attract these investments. The results outputs pertaining to the relationship between FII holdings and corporate governance reveal out that the companies in which FIIs have larger proportions of holdings have higher governance score to the companies in which FIIs have smaller proportions of holdings. Therefore, very strong and positive relationship is observed between FII holdings and corporate governance score. Hence, H01 is accepted. Likewise, the sampled companies with higher governance scores have also larger proportions of Foreign Institutional Investors holdings. Thus, very strong and positive relationship also exists between corporate governance score and FII holdings. Hence, H02 is accepted. It can be inferred on the basis of above result that foreign institutional investors prefer to invest in firms with better governance practices and their investment do improve the governance practices in the companies. Resume The theoretical and empirical literature provides mixed evidence as to the relationship between institutional holdings and corporate governance. Some of the studies put forth the evidence that corporate governance is the significant factor for institutional investment decision and their significant investment improve the governance practices in companies, while the other studies state otherwise. Where as the research findings of the present study further validate, support and enrich the literature on positive association between institutional holdings and corporate governance. Likewise, the studies provide inconclusive evidence as to the relationship between mutual funds holdings and corporate governance. But the findings of present study state that neither the mutual funds care about the governance practices of companies or their presence improve them. Similarly, the empirical literature provides indeterminate evidence on the relationship between Banks, FIs and ICs and corporate governance. But the findings of present study observe very strong and positive relationship between the two. The empirical studies observe consistent results as to foreign institutional investors invest in better-governed companies but lacks evidence that their significant presence result in better governance. The findings of present study indicate that FIIs do not care for the corporate governance only, rather their higher stake ensure better governance too. Section C 7.8 Relationship between Institutional Holdings and Firm Performance: Review of Literature Pound (1988) explored the influence of institutional ownerships on firm performance and proposed three hypotheses on the relation between institutional shareholders and firm performance: efficient-monitoring hypothesis, conflict-of-interest hypothesis, and strategic-alignment hypothesis. The efficient-monitoring hypothesis says that institutional investors have greater expertise and can monitor management at lower cost than the small atomistic shareholders. Consequently, this argument predicts a positive relationship between institutional shareholding and firm performance. Holderness and Sheehan (1988) found that for a sample of 114 US firms controlled by a majority shareholder with more than 50% of shares, both Tobins Q and accounting profits are significantly lower for firms with individual majority owners than for firms with corporate majority owners. McConnell and Servaes (1990) found a strong positive relationship between the value of the firm and the fraction of shares held by institutional investors. They found that performance increases significantly with institutional ownership. Majumdar and Nagarajan (1994) found that levels of institutional investment are positively related to the current performance levels of firms. However, a less-stronger, though positive, effect is established between changes in performance levels and changes in institutional ownership. The results are based on a study investigating U.S. institutional investors investment strategy. Han and Suk (1998) found (for a sample of US firms) that stock returns are positively related to ownership by institutional investors, thus implying that these corporate owners are actively involved in the monitoring of incumbent management. Douma, Rejie and Kabir (2006) investigated the impact of foreign institutional investment on the performance of emerging market firms and found that there is positive effect of foreign ownership on firm performance. They also found impact of foreign investment on the business group affiliation of firms. Investor protection is poor in case of firms with controlling shareh olders who have ability to expropriate assets. The block shareholders affect the value of the firm and influence the private benefits they receive from the firm. Companies with such shareholders find it expensive to raise external funds. Studies examining the relationship between institutional holdings and firm performance in different countries (mainly OECD countries) have produced mixed results. Chaganti and Damanpour (1991) and Lowenstein (1991) find little evidence that institutional ownership is correlated with firm performance. Seifert, Gonenc and Wright (2005) study does not find a consistent relationship across countries. They conclude that their inconsistent results may reflect the fact that the influence of institutional investors on firm performance is location specific. The above studies generally consider institutional investors as a monolithic group. However, Shleifer and Vishnys (1986) as well as Pounds (1988) theorizations and later empirical examinations by McConnell and Servaes (1990) suggest that shareholders are differentiable and pursue different agendas. Jensen and Merkling (1976) also show that equity ownerships by different groups have different effects on the firm performance. Agrawal and Kno eber (1996), Karpoff et al. (1996), Duggal and Miller (1999) and Faccio and Lasfer (2000) find no such significant relation between institutional holdings and firm performance. In the present study, the analysis has been conducted in two perspectives: Institutional Holdings and Firm performance (b) Constituents of institutional holdings and Firm performance The major findings of the present study on the above aspects are summarized as under: The results outputs of the first segment indicate that there is no conclusive evidence as to larger proportions of institutional holdings in sampled companies have higher average return on networth or average net profit margin and smaller proportions of institutional holdings in sampled companies have lower average return on networth or average net profit margin over the study period. To the contrary, strong and positive relationship is observed between institutional holdings and return on capital employed as well as institutional holdings and earning per share. As the average return on capital employed and average earning per share are higher in the sampled companies with higher proportions of institutional holdings and lower in the sampled companies with lower proportions of institutional holdings over the study period. Therefore, it is stated that institutional holdings and two accounting returns (return on capital employed and earning per share) are significantly correlated where as institutional holdings and other two accounting returns (return on networth and net profit margin) are not related. Hence, there is no clear evidence that institutional holdings and accounting returns are related. Likewise, strong and positive relationship is observed between institutional holdings and Tobins q. But on the other hand, weak relationship is observed between institutional holdings and risk adjusted excess return. Therefore, institutional holdings and one market-based return are significantly correlated while the institutional holdings and another market-based return are not. Thus, the findings depict contradictory results as to the relationship between institutional holdings and market

Tuesday, August 20, 2019

Typology Of Organisation And Relation To Servicescape Complexity Business Essay

Typology Of Organisation And Relation To Servicescape Complexity Business Essay The following essay critically analyses the strategic role that physical evidences play in a holistic environment, called the servicescape. The essay discusses the combination of environmental dimensions and their influence on customers and employees and how their behaviour can be mediated by the cognitive, emotional and physiological responses. This article is a practical reflection on the article by Ms. Mary Jo Bitner in which she related the combination of environmental dimensions to the internal responses of individuals, their behaviour and the ultimate effect on the organisational objectives. The researcher also visited two restaurants for the objective of completing this essay and the findings have been presented here under. This essay will conclude by defining different ways in which the effects of a servicescape are established on the organisations outcomes. Servicescape Framework Initially, Kotler (1974) suggested that a servicescape framework is the design of buying environments to produce emotional effects in the buyer that enhance his or her purchase probability. Later, Bitner used the term to describe the physical setting in which a commercial exchange is performed, delivered, and consumed within a service organisation. In her seminal article, she demonstrated that three types of objective and measurable physical stimuli exist in an organisation and merge together to form a servicescape. She further elaborated that these stimuli could be controlled by the organisation and were able to improve or hamper both the customers and employees attitude towards the organisation. She further classified the numerous examples of such physical and derived stimuli into three dimensions of environmental stimuli (Bitner, 1992). The term has now been enhanced to include any tangible component that facilitates performance or communicates the service (Bitner and Zeithaml, 2 003). Consequently, the physical evidence can be likened to a landscape. As with any landscape of an area, it includes both the interior facilities and the exterior facilities of the organisation. The interior facilities include the interior design and decoration, the layout, equipment, air quality, signage as well as the temperature and ambience. The exterior would include facilities such as the landscape, parking, road and building signage, exterior design, and the surroundings. But the physical evidence goes on to include other tangibles such as the Stationery, brochures, business cards, employee uniforms, business reports, credit statements, and other intangibles such as webpages and blog posts. The physical environment where services are delivered and experienced by the customers plays an important part in the formation of the perceptions of the customers and their future expectations about similar services (Bitner, 1992; Baker et al., 2002; Grewal et al., 2003). Hoffman and Turley (2002) described that a lot of different organisational objectives can be achieved and enhanced through a critical examination of the servicescape. According to Bitner (1992), most organisations are invariably affected by their physical environments but to different degrees. Some service organisations such as hotels, restaurants, clubs and insurance companies are affected to a greater extent by the physical environment than other organisations such as ATMs and hot dog stands. It should be noted here that the physical environment does not just influence clients but it also has a significant impact on the employees. Bitner noted that satisfied employees generate satisfactory services that go on to satisfy customers. Therefore, the business environment should not only cater to the needs and demands of the customers but also concurrently to those of the employees. The following figure has been extracted from the original treatise by Ms. Mary Jo Bitner (1992) to describe the different types of service organisations based on the variation in the form in usage of the servicescape. The vertical aspect of the typology describes the type of organisation based on who performs actions within the servicescape. It has been categorised into a self service (customer only), interpersonal services (both customer and employee) and remote service (employee only). On one side, service is performed by the customer only in the level of employee activity is almost non-existent. The other extreme is signified by the remote service organisations where customer involvement and interaction are non-significant (in relation to the servicescape). The figure, the horizontal aspect describes the complexity of the servicescape. It has also been categorised as lean and elaborate. Lee refers to those servicescape settings where there are very few elements involved and their intricacy is minimal. Other servicescapes that are very complicated and involve a bigger mix of elements and variables are termed as elaborate. C:UsersKhalidDesktopo_c44bab260d23dc1e_002.jpg Fig. 1: Typology of Organisation and Relation to Servicescape Complexity As can be seen, some organisations such as a Golf Club are very client-oriented with huge emphasis on the servicescape. In such organisations, the servicescapes are well-developed to attract and satisfy customers. Other organisations also employing a significant emphasis on the servicescape at which are employee oriented include many professional services organisations, and here, the servicescapes are developed to satisfy the employees. On the other hand, there are organisations that do not depend a lot on the servicescape design and minimal effort is dedicated to the development of their servicescapes. However, attention is paid to whether the organisation is customer oriented or employee oriented to achieve maximum output from invested effort. As has been described, the physical setting can enhance or hinder the realization of both internal organisational objectives and external marketing goals. Thus, the servicescape can enhance or diminish customer satisfaction and employee motivation and concurrently help in attracting and maintaining customers. The overall servicescape framework consists of physical environmental dimensions which contribute to the holistic environment of the organisation. These physical dimensions, in combination, are termed as the perceived servicescape of the organisation and elicit internal responses from both employees and the customers. These internal responses contribute to both the individual behaviour of the customers and employees and their social interactions. These behaviours, in turn, contribute to the achievement of the objectives and goals of the organisation. Thus, organisations focus on achieving an optimal mix of physical environment factors and try to moderate the internal responses of both employees and customers to realize favourable behaviours and ultimately achieve the organisational objectives. Untitled.png Fig. 2: Bitners Servicescape Model The Physical Environmental Dimensions Bitner (1992) classify the physical environment into three dimensions: Ambient Conditions: This aspect of the physical environment refers to the conditions surrounding employees and customers that can be sensed through the human five senses. These are the general conditions of the environment of the organisation and include temperature, voice, odour, air quality, et cetera. The conditions are usually prominent when they are extreme (either very cold or hot), the customer spends a lot of time in the environment, and they do not match his expectations. Spatial Layout And Functionality: These refer to the seamless layout of the organisation, especially equipment and furnishing, which is used to achieve maximum productivity in the most efficient and effective manner. These environmental conditions are most noticeable in self service settings and in circumstances where tasks are complex and there is little time to achieve them. Signs, Symbols, Artefacts And Branding: These refer to the signage, icons and signals that amplify the message from the organisation to the intended customers. They also include the personal artefacts of the employees and staff members in the style and colour of the decor used to furnish the organisation. These are most important when repositioning a service, forming first impression, and when communicating new service ideas. They are also highly essential in highly competitive organisations where they are used to differentiate and achieve uniqueness from the competition. Internal Responses to the Servicescape Internal responses of both employees and customers in service organisations to the physical dimensions of the surroundings are classified as cognitive, emotional, and physiological. As such, these responses elicit overall behaviour of the participants in the servicescape and this behaviour can be classified as a function of the internal responses to the perceived servicescape. In fact, perceptions of the servicescape are the real reason that causes certain beliefs, emotions and physiological feelings that influence behaviours. Cognitive responses: Cognition refers to beliefs and as such, these responses influence peoples beliefs both about the place, and the people and products found in that place. These responses include general beliefs, categorisations and assigning symbolic meanings to different objects to employees and customers. Emotional responses: According to Mehrabian and Russell, the emotion-eliciting qualities of an environment can be described along two dimensions; the pleasure-displeasure quality and the degree of arousal that place can elicit. These two dimensions describe peoples emotional response to the environment of the organisation. Typically, the environment of any organisation can be located on these two dimensions. Research has shown that predictions about behaviour along these two dimensions are usually accurate. For example, environments that make people happy and cause them to enjoy themselves are likely to be places where people spend most of their time and money. In contrast, people usually avoid places that cause feelings of displeasure. Similarly, environments that cause arousal will usually be the places that people usually inhabit. Physiological responses:

Monday, August 19, 2019

Cultural Differences in Joint Ventures Essay -- essays research papers

ESSAY TOPIC (1) :A joint venture is affected by the cultural distance between two partners. In what ways are joint ventures and types of international collaboration affected by cultural differences? INDEX INTRODUCTION†¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦2 What is culture?†¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦2-3 The Cultural Orientation Model†¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦.4 The cultural Gap†¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦5-6 Understanding Cultural Differences†¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦.6 The Challenge of Cultural Success†¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦..7 Cross-cultural training as a solution†¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦8 The effectiveness of the cross cultural training programs†¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦8-9 Future Directions for Cross-Cultural Training and International Business Assignments†¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦..10. Conclusion†¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦..10 BIBLIOGRAPHY†¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦..11 INTRODUCTION Since the end of World War II, international operations have become a reality for an increasing number of corporations. Many of these initial efforts began as simple export schemes to sell goods overseas to supplement domestic sales. Over time, however, international operations have become increasingly more complex: from joint-ventures to purchasing existing foreign firms to ‘green-field’ start-ups. While export operations usually require no more than extended business trips overseas, more complex international operations demand long-term assignments of key personnel outside their home-country. What would normally be considered routine business transactions in the home country can become very complicated when they are conducted between individuals and organizations from different cultures. In this essay we will examine how this cultural gap can affect international business and joint ventures. What is culture? The word 'culture' is often described in terms of concrete ideas or social artifacts. Gary R. Weaver describes some common conceptions such as "good taste," "art or music," or "something that people in exotic foreign lands had."1 However, culture in the context of international assignments relates to how people perceive the world and the influence this perception has on their actions. It is culture on the interpersonal level. Different cultures can perceive the same thing differently, which leads to miscommunication and misunderstanding when one crosses into another culture not their own. We... ...s: Software of the Mind, (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill 1998) 4. 5.Ibid., 4. 6.Ibid., 4. 7.Paul E. Rohrlich, "Why Do We Study Intercultural Communication?," in Culture, Communication and Conflict: Readings in Intercultural Relations, 2d ed., ed. Gary R. Weaver (Needham Heights, MA: Simon & Schuster Publishing, 1998), 84-87. 8.Ibid., 85. 9.Ibid., 85. 10. (Schneider & Barsoux 1997:1). 11. Satish P. Deshpande and Chockalingam Viswesvaran, "Is Cross-cultural Training of Expatriate Managers Effective: A Meta Analysis," International Journal of Intercultural Relations 16 (1992): 296. 12.Environments," in Culture, Communication and Conflict: Readings in Intercultural Relations, 2d ed., ed. Gary R. Weaver (Needham Heights, MA: Simon & Schuster Publishing, 1998), 185-186. 13. Stewart J. Black and Mark Mendenhall, "Cross-cultural Training Effectiveness: A Review and a Theoretical Framework for Future Research," Academy of Management Review, No. 1 (1990), 132. 14. Deshpande and Viswesvaran, 301. 15. Rosalie L. Tung, "Selection and Training of Personnel for Overseas Assignments," Columbia Journal of World Business, (Spring 1981), 68-78.